Whitmore Oxygen Company v. State Tax Commission of Utah and Grant A. Brown, Elisha Warner, Milton Twitchell and Roscoe E. Hammond : Brief of Defendant State Tax Commission in Opposition to the Granting of a Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1948
Whitmore Oxygen Company v. State Tax
Commission of Utah and Grant A. Brown, Elisha
Warner, Milton Twitchell and Roscoe E.
Hammond : Brief of Defendant State Tax
Commission in Opposition to the Granting of a
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
G. Hal Taylor; Wayne Christoffersen; Attorneys for Defendant;
This Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Rehearing, Whitmore Oxygen Co. v. Utah Tax Commission, No. 7154 (Utah Supreme Court, 1948).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/828
In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WHITMORE OXYGEN COMPANY, 
Pla.imtiff, 
YS. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defenda;nt. 
Case No. 
7154 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE TAX COMMISSION IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANTING OF A 
PE'TITION FOR REHEARING 
F I L E QHAL TAYLO~ 
OCT 19 \9GB ·.WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN, 
---dUo.rneys for Defendant. 
"--cliitK:s\J;RtMi:-aouRT,UtAH 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
Argument -----------------------------------------------·---------------------····-·--··--····--····-··---··· 2 
Conclusion ----······-·····-·-----····················---·········---·-------·········-············--------- 12 
Statement 1 
CASES CITED 
Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292 .... ------·-··--·----------·----·-----··-------·------·----------· 12 
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619................................ 11 
Dahlquist v. D. & R. G. Railway, 52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833............ 10 
Department of Treasury of Indiana, et al v. International 
Harveste~ Company (1943), 221 Indiana 416, 47 N.E. 2d 1,50.... 6 
Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Gorp., 
313 U. S. 62, 85 L. ed. 1188 ................ -----------··---··--------····-·---···-·--···--· 8 
Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, 11 Pac. 618·---··--·-·-------·--·---···---··-···--· 12 
In Re Knight, 4 Utah 237........................................................................ 12 
International Harvester Company v. Department of Treasury 
of Indiana (1943), 322 U. S. 340, 88 L. ed. 1313........................ 7 
J.D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen (1938), 
304 U. S. 307, 82 L. ed. 1365 ............ ---······---···-···-·---·--···-·-------········· 2 
Jones v. House, 4 Utah 484, 11 Pac. 619 .. ------·---------·-·--·······-········--····-···· 12 
Storen v. J.D. Adams Manufacturing Company ('1937), 
212 Indiana 343, 7 N.E. 2d 941........................................................ 4 
Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 170 Pac. 774 ............ ·-·----···-··-----··---··-···--· 10 
STATUTES CITED 
Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 (Burns, Indiana Statute 
Annotated, 1933, 1943 replacement)............................................ 3 
Laws of Indiana, 1933, 78th Session, Page 392.................................... 3 
Laws of Indiana, 1937, 80th Session ....... ·-····---·--·····-····---·----------------------· 4 
:REGULATION 
Sales Tax Regulation No. 12.................................................................... 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\VHIT~IORE OXYGEN COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendarnt. 
Case No. 
7154 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE TAX COMMISSION IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANTING OF A 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff herein filed a petition for rehearing in the 
above 'entitled case and based its petition upon the fol-
lowing grounds : 
I 
The court, having reached the conclusion that "for 
tax purposes the sale of the cylinders was consummated 
in Indiana,'' erred in holding that the sale was not sub-
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2 
ject to the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 as the 
same was in effect in the year 1941. 
II 
By the inclusion of supplemental comments, counsel 
for plaintiff infers that the court erred in holding that 
Tax Commission Form TC 71, as filed by the Tax Com-
mission by taxpayers, did not constitute a us·e tax re-
turn. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The court, having reached the conclusion that "for tax 
purposes the sale of the cylinders was consummated in 
Indiana," ·erred in holding that the sale was not subject 
to the Indiana Gross Income Thx Act of 1933 as the same 
was in ,effect in the year 1941. 
Plaintiff's argument that the court erred in holding 
that the sale herein involved was not subject to the In-
diana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, is apparently 
based upon plaintiff's supposition that the writer's cita-
tion of the case of" J. D. A~ams Manufactr~Mrimg Oompa;n;y 
v. Sto·rern (1938), 304 U.S. 307, 82 L. ed. 1365, was loosely 
cited and that the original presentation of the problem 
by counsel for the Tax Commission was not adequate. 
With such contention we most heartily disagree. It is 
the position of defendant that the J. D. Adams case is 
controlling in this matter and that the argument pre-
sented by counsel for rehearing is entirely without merit, 
and, further, that the authorities cited are just plainly 
not in point. 
The plaintiff makes the assertion that the Indiana 
Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 was amended ''to meet 
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3 
the Adams case." (Plaintiff's Brief, page 5.) Plaintiff 
does not explain how this an1endment was made or what 
such amendment is and we are unable to determine just 
which portion of the Indiana Act that counsel feels was 
amended to meet this case. 
Subsection (a) of 6-±-2606, Gross Income Tax Act of 
1933, (Burns, Indiana Statute Annotated, 1933, 1943 
replacement) which excepts interstate commerce as 
originally passed by the Indiana Legislature, reads as 
follows: 
''There shall be excepted from the gross in-
come taxable under this act: 
'' (a) So much of such gross income as is 
derived from business conducted in commerce be-
tween this state and other states of the United 
States, or between this state and :foreign coun-
tries, to the extent to which the State of Indiana 
is prohibited from taxing under the Oonstitution 
of the United States of America." Laws of the 
St,ate of Indiarna, 1933, 78th Sessvon, page 392. 
This section was amended in 1937 (approved March 
9, 1937) to read as follows: 
''That section 6 of the first above entitled act 
be amended to read as follows : Sec. 6. There shall 
be excepted from the gross income taxable under 
this act: 
'' (a) So much of such gross income as is 
derived from business conducted in commerce be-
tween this state and other states of the United 
States, or between this state and foreign coun-
tries, but only to the extent to which the State 
of Indiana is prohibited from taxing such gross 
income by the Constitution of the United States 
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4 
of America. * * *" Laws 10/ India.t11ta, 1937 80th 
Sess~on, page 61~. 
The sub-section, as so amended, has remained in 
·effect since March 8, 1937 to the present date. It will be 
noted that the only changes made by the 1937 amendment 
is to insert the words "but only" preceding the words 
"to the extent", and "such gross income" following the 
words "prohibited from taxing" in subsection (a) of 
section 6. 
The Adams case was decided by the Supreme Court 
of Indiana, April 30,1937, some 61 days after the Act was 
amended. In Storen v. J. D. Adams Manufacturing Com-
pany (1937), 212 Ind. 343, 7 N.E. 2d 941, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana sustained the constitutionality of the 
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933. The case was 
then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States 
and was subsequently decided on the 18th day of May, 
1938. 
Section 1, of the Indiana Gross Income 'Tax Act of 
1933, as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the J. D. Adams case, "declares that the phrase 
'gross income' as used in the act, means, inter alia, gross 
receipts derived from the trades, businesses, or com-
merce, and receipts from investment of capital, includ-
ing interest.'' Section I, as it defines ''gross income,'' 
was amended in 1937, which entirely reworded the sec-
tion. However, since no material change was made after 
1937, it may be concluded that no amendment was made 
to section I, as it defines ''gross income,'' by reason of the 
J.D. Adams Company case. The only other section of the 
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Indiana Gross Incmue Tax Act of 1933, which was con-
sidered by the Suprerne Court of the United State~, was 
section II, which, as pointed out by such court, ''imposes 
a tax ascertained by the application of specified rates 
to the gross income of every resident of the state and the 
gross income of every non-resident derived from sources 
within the state." The same argument applies with re-
gard to section II; that is, no amendment was made 
except in 1937 which could not have been influenced by 
the J.D. Adams case. 
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is the opinion 
of the writer that no amendment was made to the Indiana 
Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 because of the J. D. Adams 
Company case. As we view it, the Adams case merely 
placed an interpretation upon the foregoing S'ections 
which precludes the State of Indiana from including the 
receipts from interstate sales in the measure of the tax. 
The amendment made to chapter 2601 in 1941, referred 
to by plaintiff in his brief on page 5, would have no 
affect upon the decision in this case even if it be viewed 
as having some material change in the definition of 
"gross income" for the reason that chapter 140, Laws 
of Indiana, 1941, page 418, which amended section 1, did 
not take effect until the 1st day of January, 1942, which 
was after the contract was accepted by the Whitmore 
Oxygen Company. The contract being accepted April18, 
1941. 
As indicated by this court, the Adams case holds 
with regard to the case at Bar, that a state may not tax 
receipts from interstate sales for the reason that inter-
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state commerce would be subjected to the risk of a double 
tax burden. Defendant ·elects to stand and rely on the 
J.D. Adams Manufacturing Company case as originally 
argued. 
Now, curiously enough, the plaintiff cites as author-
ity for the proposition that the sale was subject to the 
Indiana tax, the case of the Department of Treasury of 
Indiana, et ·al, v. International Harvester Company 
(1943), 221 Indiana 416, 47 N.E. 2d 150. Although this 
case was decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in the 
year 1943, the case arose by reason of the fact that ap-
pellees sued to recover gross income taxes paid to the 
State of Indiana during the years 1935 and 1936 and thus 
of necessity the case was decided under the identical law 
as existed when the J.D. Adams case arose. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in deciding 
the International Harvester Company case cited the J. 
D. Adams case and said: 
''In that case an Indiana corporation which 
manufactured products and maintained its home 
office, principal place of business and factory in 
Indiana sold those products to customers in other 
states and foreign countries upon orders taken 
subject to approval at the home office. It was 
held that the commerce clause ('Art. I, sec. 8 of 
the Constitution) was a barrier to the imposition 
of the tax on the gross receipts from such sales. 
But as we held in the Wood Pr·eserving Corpora-
tion case, neither the commerce clause nor the 
14th amendment prevent the imposition of tax 
from receipts from an imJtlrast1ate transaction even 
though the total activities from which the local 
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transaction derives may have incidental inter-
state attributes.'' Internatiiowal H~ar'vesitler Oom-
pany r. Department 10f Treasury of India,wa 
(1943), 322 U.S. 340, 88 L. Ed. 1313. (Italics sup-
plied) 
Plaintiff has apparently set forth ''Class D '' sales 
as being the type of transaction which most nearly 
parallels the \Yhitmore Oxygen-Linde Air Products 
transaction herein involved. The Supreme Court of the 
United States in the International Harvester Company 
case in considering Olass D sales said: 
''The Class D sales are sales by an Indiana 
seller of Indiana goods to an out of state buyer 
who comes to Indiana, takes delivery there and 
transports the goods to another state. The Wood 
Preserving Corporation case indicates that it is 
immaterial to the present issue that the goods are 
to be transported out of Indiana immediately on 
delivery. ~foreover, both the agreement to sell and 
the delivery took place in Indiana. Thos,e events 
would be adequate to sustain a sales tax by In-
diana." (Italics supplied.) 
The Wood Preserving Corporation case referr,ed 
to above by the Supreme Court was a cas-e in which 
the respondent, Wood Preserving Corporation, enter,ed 
into certain contracts with the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road Company to sell railroad ties. The ties were pur-
chased by the respondent from local companies in the 
state of Indiana and the Indiana vendors delivered the 
ties at loading points on the railroad in Indiana. An in-
spector for the railroad and an agent of the respondent 
accepted the ties and supervised the loading. Inspection 
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and loading were simultaneous. The Supreme Court in 
speaking of this liability said: ''The transactions were 
none the 'less intrastate activities because the ties thus 
sold and delivered were forthwith loaded on the railroad 
cars to go to Ohio for treatment." Department of Ttreas-
ury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62, 85 L. ed. 
1188. 
We submit that the type of transaction involved in 
the International Harvester Company case and the Wood 
Preserving Corporation case in no way parallels the 
transaction herein involved. In those cases the purchaser 
of the goods went· to the State of Indiana and himself 
took physical possession or delivery of the goods within 
that state, and thereafter transported such goods outside 
of the state on his own account. 
We believe that the distinction is clear and that the 
principle of law which may be deduced from the J. D. 
Adams case and the International Harvester Company 
case is, ·that wher;e a tnansact~on is oompleted withim t:he 
borders of the state and nothing furthBr ·remains to be 
·done such .as, sh~pment ~out of the sbate:, that. such state 
may constitutiowally impose .a gnoss ·receipts t'ax o·r 
similar tax upon such transaction. However, where the 
trans·act~on is s'o inse,pla.rably oonnecfAed with interst•ate 
commerce by the terms of the contract, that the goods 
must be shipped out ·Of the state before s~aid t,ramsaction 
is oompleted, then ,no tax may constitvutiowally be ~.m­
poSIBd. 
In the case at Bar, we have a situation wherein 
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the vendor, Linde Air Products Company, agreed to sell 
the cylinders to the Whitmore Oxygen Company f.o.b. 
Speedway, Indiana. Deliv,ery of said cylinders was made 
to a common carrier, and thus we take the view that 
while the sa.J.e was consummated in Indiana, that some-
thing more was contemplated by the terms of the con-
tract than was contemplated in ·the situation as outlined 
by Class D sales in the International Harvester Company 
case. In that case the buyer went to the state of Indiana 
and personally took delivery and then later himself ·trans-
ported the goods to another state. 
We submit, therefore, that this court was corr•ect in 
holding that "The sale is, then, one which the Supreme 
Court has said may not be taxed by the state of Indiana, 
under the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933. '' 
Point II 
By the inclu.sion of supplemental comments, counsel 
for plaintiff infers that the court •erred in holding that Tax 
Commission Form TC 71, as filed with the Tax Commission 
by taxpayers, did not constitute a use tax return. 
In plaintiff's supplemental comments, the conten-
tion is again set forth that the filing of Form 'TC 71, 
entitled "Sales and Use Tax Return", consisting of 
two parts in which entries relating to sales tax have 
been made in the sales tax portion of the form, but in 
which ,entries have not been made in the use tax portion 
of the form, constitutes a use tax return for the purpose 
of starting the period of the statute of limitations for 
collecting a use tax deficiency determination. 
It is submitted that this contention has been argued 
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and decided, and the supplemental comments made by 
the plaintiff are merely an attempt on the part of plain-
tiff to have the court adopt his origina:l theory that the 
filing of TC 71, with the use tax portion blank, starts 
the period of the statute of limita;tions. 
We believe the fact that the question involved is one 
of first impression nationally and that several members 
of the Bar of sister states are concerned with the ruling 
of this court is of no importance and certainly not suf-
ficient reason to grant a rehearing. It is fundamental in 
this jurisdiction that, ''New points first brought to the 
Supreme Court's attention on application for rehearing, 
though they were just as available on original hearing, 
cannot be considered.'' Dahlquist v. Dmuuer & Rio Grarnd 
Railway, 52 Utah 438, 174 Pac. 833; Swans:orn v. rSims, 
51 Utah 485,170 Pac. 774. 
We take the view that the argument of plaintiff set 
forth in the supplemental comments, while, as we view it 
are without merit, are also improperly presented inas-
much as such argument was just as available on the 
original hearing. Shou1d the court feel that the argu-
ment as presented with regard to the filing of Form 
TC 71 should be considered, we would like to point out 
that such argument is faulty inasmuch as Regulation No. 
12, cited by plaintiff, which requires that a return must 
be made even though no tax is due, applies only to the 
sales tax. 
Sa:les tax regulation No. 12~ quoted by plaintiff, has 
a heading which appears as follows: 
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12-Filing of Returns. 
(Applies to sales tax only.) 
The portion of this regulation italicized by plaintiff in 
his brief on page 9, which reads as follows : ''The 11eturn 
mu.st be made ene-n though no tax lis due," refers only 
to sales tax liability imposed under the Sales Tax A~t. 
No such requirement is impos~ed upon taxpayers whose 
sole liability is that of a consmner or user for use tax: 
liability. Such a person shall make the return on Form 
TC 326 '' Consmner Use Tax Return.'' 
Inasmuch as the case at Bar involves a use tax de-
ficiency and not a sales tax deficiency, plaintiff's con-
clusion that the Tax Commission would require a tax-
payer who had no use tax liability "to file a sales and 
use tax form 71, regardless of whether therie is amy tag; 
due ~or not," is, we believe, totally without merit. 
It is the law in this jurisdiction that no hearing wil~ 
be granted "unless the court has minconstrued or over-
looked some material fact or facts, or has overlooked 
some statute or decision which may affect the result, or 
has based the decision on some wrong principle of law 
or has either misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result." Oummings v. Nielson, 
42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619. 
It is submitted that no material fact is presented in 
plaintiff's argument, nor is any fact presented which 
could not have been presented in the original argument. 
There is no indication that the court has misconstrued or 
overlooked anything that would materially affect this 
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case and no rehearing should be granted where nothing 
new or important is offered for consideration. Du-
chenearu v. Hou.se, 4 Utah 483, 11 Pac. 618; Jones v. 
H-ouse, 4 Utah 484, 11 Pac. 619. Plaintiff's only reason 
for a rehearing which might be considered by the court is 
his assertion that the J. D. Adams case is not in point. 
Such, we submit, is not the case and as heretofore stated, 
defendant relies upon the rule announced in the Adams 
case. 
CONCLUSIDN 
In conclusion we submit that the plaintiff has not 
presented sufficient reason for granting a rehearing. 
Plaintiff indicates that the court has based its decision 
on a wrong principle of law as to the taxability of sa'les 
made by an Indiana vendor to customers in other states. 
However, we submit that this court did not base its de-
cision on a wrong principle of law but reaffirmed and 
set forth a proper interpretation of the law with regard 
to interstate sales. 
In the case of Brown 1J. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, and 
In Re McKnight, 4 Utah 237, this court recognized the 
doctrine that "to justify a rehearing a strong case must 
be made. The Supreme Court must be convinced either 
that it failed to ·consider some material point in the case; 
that it erred in its conclusion or that some matter has 
been discovered which was unknown at the time of the 
original hearing.'' 
This court in its well reasoned opinion has thorough-
ly examined the issues in this case and the plaintiff has 
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not made out a case or presented sufficient reason for 
this court to grant a rehearing. 
THEREFORE, it is requested that a rehearing be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. HAL TAYLOR, 
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
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